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Abstract
Scalable and highly available systems often require data stores
that offer weaker consistency guarantees than traditional relational
databases systems. The correctness of these applications highly de-
pends on the resilience of the application model against data inconsis-
tencies. In particular regarding application security, it is difficult to
determine which inconsistencies can be tolerated and which might lead
to security breaches.
In this paper, we discuss the problem of how to develop an ac-
cess control layer for applications using weakly consistent data stores
without loosing the performance benefits gained by using weaker con-
sistency models. We present ACGreGate, a Java framework for im-
plementing correct access control layers for applications using weakly
consistent data stores. Under certain requirements on the data store,
ACGreGate ensures that the access control layer operates correctly
with respect to dynamically adaptable security policies. We used AC-
GreGate to implement the access control layer of a student manage-
ment system. This case study shows that practically useful security
policies can be implemented with the framework incurring little over-
head. A comparison with a setup using a centralized server shows the
benefits of using ACGreGate for scalability of the service to geo-scale.
1 Introduction
The ongoing globalization and digitization of services forces companies to
build highly available and scalable applications that operate with low la-
tency anywhere on earth. By their nature, these applications need to be
distributed and replicated on a global scale. System designers choose weaker
consistency guarantees for applications to gain the required performance and
availability. Typically, the data stores underlying these types of systems are
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
07
00
5v
1 
 [c
s.D
B]
  2
2 J
an
 20
18
key-value stores where objects are addressed by keys and have a value that
can be read and updated. To provide better performance and fail-over for
possible outages, the data is replicated to different locations. Because of
weaker consistency guarantees offered by the store, operations can be is-
sued on any of the replicas without delay and the modifications of the data
state are usually asynchronously sent to the other replicas. Data stores sup-
porting this model are for example Amazon Dynamo[13], Riak KV[6] and
Cassandra[1]. But weakening consistency guarantees brings new challenges
to the application design and implementation as this model makes it difficult
to reason about application correctness.
Access Control One important topic of application design is access con-
trol. As definition of access control, we follow the definition provided in prior
work[20].
In an application, we distinguish two kinds of operations, data opera-
tions and policy operations. Data operations read or modify the application
data, and policy operations read or modify permissions of users on objects.
Although the need for correct access control is indisputable, implementing
it is a daunting task. This is reflected by the OWASP Top 10, an index
of the ten security vulnerabilities most often found in web applications. In
the OWASP[5] Top 10 from 2013, “Missing Function Level Access Control”
was ranked 7th, in the 2017 release candidate, “Broken Access Control” was
ranked 4th.
Implementing access control for an application using a weakly consistent
datastore is difficult because the requirements of access control seem to be
in conflict with the inherent properties of weak consistency. The program-
mer’s intuition is that changes to permissions of a user for an object should
be effective immediately in order to provide protection for subsequent data
operations which may add sensitive data to the store. Further, changing
the access control rules should be possible in order to adapt the applica-
tion to organizational changes. For example, new employees may enter a
company, existing employees may leave. Even the structure of the company
might change: departments might get restructured, adding or discharging
responsibilities. But despite changes, the decisions on all servers need to be
consistent with the current access control rules.
For some applications, access control is deeply embedded in the design
of the application. For example, friend lists in social networks provide a
mechanism to influence what data becomes visible to other users. A classical
example is the social network where Alice added her boss Bob in her friend
list, and afterwards she wants to hide her photos of the last party from him.
Alice removes Bob from her friend list and afterwards uploads the photos,
assuming that Bob does not have access to her photos anymore. But on
some server, the updates might get applied in a different order giving Bob
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temporary access to the photos. This anomaly leaks data and is the result
of the weaker ordering guarantee of the data stores.
As the examples show, the access control system should be dynamic and
at the same time consistent to avoid data leakage. These dynamic changes
should also be reflected in the decisions to protect the data stored in the
system from being leaked. Operations modifying the access control policy
can make up a considerable part of the overall operations performed in the
system.
Weaker consistency guarantees further result in possible conflicts of con-
current permission assignments. For correct access control, it is often not
easy to see how these conflicts can be solved and which conflict-resolution
strategies lead to incorrect access control decisions and hence to data leakage.
As an example, we can consider the policy that a consultant may not be
responsible for two companies. When instantiating Charly as consultant for
company A, someone else might concurrently instantiate Charly as consul-
tant for company B. On the local server, the threat of breaking the security
policy may not be detectable since the updates are initially only visible on
some other replica. When solving this concurrency conflict, one has to be
very careful not to end up in a situation where Charly is consultant for both
companies.
Contributions In this paper, we discuss possible architectures to deploy
access control in applications using weakly consistent data stores (Section
2). We present requirements for the datastore which make it possible to
implement access control correctly, and we introduce ACGreGate, a Java
framework for implementing such an access control layer (Section 3). To the
best of our knowledge, ACGreGate is the first framework which allows to
build access control layers for applications using a weakly consistent datas-
tore. Our case study shows that practical applications can be secured using
ACGreGate even for complex access control policies with data dependencies
(Section 4).
2 Access Control Layer Deployment
In the introduction we have seen that many invariants that are easily im-
plementable under strong consistency are not available in weakly consistent
datastores like bounds on values due to the lack of a globally total order on
operations. How can we implement access control in environments like that?
We can either take a centralized approach where a central server is respon-
sible for keeping the permission data consistent or we can take a distributed
approach which is more complex but may yield better performance. In the
following, we discuss both approaches in detail.
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Figure 1: Central access control server architecture.
Central Access Control Server Following the requirement of a consis-
tent access control decision leads to a design as depicted in Figure 1 where
a central server makes the access control decision for all distributed copies
of the application. This architecture is common in authentication infras-
tructures. The modifications of the access control rules are handled by the
central access control server. All operations performed on remote servers
executing the target application are sent to the access control server to make
the decision whether the operation should be accepted. This architecture
solves the problem of inconsistencies in the access control policy because
there is only one copy of the policy on the central server which handles re-
quests in a linearized way. Since all access control decisions are made by this
server, we cannot have data leakage because of inconsistent decisions.
The problem with this architecture becomes clear when evaluating the
performance (cf. Section 5). Typically, the performance of an application
in our scenario is bound by the performance of the storage backend. If the
access control server is not running on the same machine as this backend
nor is collacated on a fast local network, the performance of the application
becomes bound by the network latency. This yields an unacceptable per-
formance overhead compared to a system that does not implement access
control. A setup relying on a central access control server is therefore infea-
sible even for non-large scale systems where delays between nodes are in the
order of 10 ms.
Local Consistent Access Control Server What about using a primary
backup model for the access control layer (cf. Figure 2)? In this setting, the
policy state on all replicas is kept in sync. But the relation between data
and policy is not maintained properly. Consider the case that we want to
declassify information before publishing it. If we apply the new policy to the
old snapshot of the data, we leak classified information. Hence, we need to
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Figure 2: Local consistent access control server architecture.
keep track of all policy modifications and have to apply them consistently to
their respective data snapshot.
Another problem is that the strongly consistent policy state reduces the
availability. When the application tries to modify the access control policy
during a partition of the network, either the master replica or one of the
slave replicas is not reachable, thus delaying the execution of the policy
modification. Since the application cannot continue without the updated
policy, the application is blocked until the network partition is resolved.
Combined Policy and Data State As the discussion shows, there is a
strong inherent coupling of permissions and data. We have already shown
in prior work[19] that correct access control can be established by putting
the policy and data state in the same weakly consistent datastore. Our
definition of access control is given in [20] and is based on the fact that
policy modifications should become active after they have been issued and
until the same policy is modified again. This property can be implemented
without reverting to strong consistency or establishing global invariants.
3 Access Control Implementation
The model presented in [19] describes the correctness criteria for access con-
trol in weakly consistent information systems according to the above men-
tioned access control semantics. But there is a considerable gap between the
theoretical model and an implementation of this model. In the following, we
show how the different correctness criteria can be met by an implementation.
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3.1 Requirements derived from the Correctness Condition
The theoretical model considers possible traces of the system. Operations
performed by the system need to adhere to the access control policy at the
time of the operation execution. Given a concrete trace of a system, this
property is straight-forward to verify: We iterate over the operations in the
trace and compute the policy based on the policy modification performed
and visible at that time and check whether the operation was permitted.
When implementing this model in a real application-level access control
system, the task changes. Instead of checking an existing trace, we need to
make sure that only operations that are allowed by the current access con-
trol policy are actually executed by the system; the operations not permitted
should be rejected by the access control layer. This ensures that every result-
ing trace of the system is valid according to the theoretical model of correct
access control.
In order to be able to implement correct access control, we will now derive
several prerequisites on the context. The correctness criterium consists of
two parts that we will discuss separately: Retaining the protection relation,
and correctness of the resolution of conflicts because of concurrent policy
modifications.
Retaining the protection relation All policy modifications visible when
executing a data modification need to be visible on a replica, before the data
operation can be applied. The assumption is that policy modifications can
protect subsequent data modifications. By enforcing that the policy modifi-
cations is visible before applying that data modification, the model ensures
that protected data remains protected and does not leak because of an out-
dated access control policy. This relation between a policy modification and
a subsequent data modification is known as protection relation. As hinted in
[19], the protection relation is part of the per-object causality relation. This
relation holds between updates u1 and u2 on the same object in the data
store if u1 was visible when update u2 was executed or the other way round.
If a data store retains the causality relation such that u1 is always visible
before u2, we say that the data store is causally consistent. As the example
shows, support for causal consistency in the data store is one requirement
for being able to implement the access control model correctly.
Causal consistency is known to be the strongest consistency criterion that
can still be implemented in a highly-available way. Several data stores imple-
ment causal consistency, for example COPS [16], Orbe [14], ChainReaction
[8], GentleRain [15], and Antidote [7, 12].
Conflict Resolution The second part of the correctness criterion for ac-
cess control is concerned with solving the conflicts introduced by concurrent
policy modifications in a conservative manner. The policies are modeled in
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form of a set of permissions. Each user has for each object in the store a
set of permissions on this object. These permission sets may be updated by
multiple users concurrently, which can lead to inconsistencies. The required
semantics of the data type is already given in [19] in form of the specification
of a conflict-free replicated data-type (CRDT). For two sets of permissions
s1 and s2 concurrently assigned for the same user and the same object, the
Policy CRDT takes the intersection of s1 and s2. This corresponds to tak-
ing only those permissions that both updates agreed on. This semantics
can be easily implemented in a data store supporting CRDTs by taking the
implementation of a multi-value register and modifying the read operation.
A multi-value register retains all concurrently assigned values. Assignments
to the register only replace those values visible when the operation is exe-
cuted on the data store. In case of the Policy CRDT, this yields both sets
of permissions that have been assigned concurrently. We can compute the
intersection of these sets as the result of the read operation.
3.2 Requirements of an Online Check
In the theoretical model, the decision procedure operates on the same snap-
shot of data and policies as the operation to be executed. When implement-
ing the model, we have to make sure to preserve this relation between policy
and data state. Separating the operations and thereby working on different
snapshots of data and policy state can lead to incorrect behavior.
One scenario is that we base our decision on an outdated policy. As al-
ready discussed with relation to the theoretical model, policy modifications
are usually used to protect data in the store. A policy modification might
restrict access to confidential information which was added to the store after
the policy modification. If this restriction is not reflected in the outdated
policy, the access to the confidential information might be granted to an
unauthorized user. The other way round, a data modification might have
declassified information which is then safe to be read. If we operate on out-
dated data, this data might still reflect the confidential information because
the declassifying operations are missing, which again leads to data leakage.
Other replicas accept concurrent operations and these operations can in gen-
eral get visible at the local replica at any time. The conclusion is that there
is no safe order in which we can read the policy and execute the operation
to be checked. Both operations need to happen atomically.
Atomic operations are supported in some weakly consistent data stores
as highly available transactions (HATs) [11, 9, 7]. HATs support atomicity
without reducing availability. The main difference to strongly consistent
transactions is that HATs do not guarantee serializability of the updates, but
the usage of CRDTs solves the problem of conflicting concurrent updates.
The Cure protocol[7] for example supports transactional causal+ consistency,
an extension of causal consistency with highly available transactions.
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Figure 3: Architecture of ACGreGate.
To summarize, in order to implement our framework for correct access
control in applications using weakly consistent data store, we require from the
underlying datastore to support causal consistency, CRDTs as data model
and transaction support for atomic multi-object updates. All of these prop-
erties are supported by the Cure protocol[7].
3.3 Framework Implementation
ACGreGate is a framework for correct access control layers of applications
written in Java, that use Antidote as datastore. Antidote[12] is an open-
source implementation of the Cure protocol written in Erlang with a variety
of client libraries for different programming languages. We built our frame-
work ACGreGate on top of this provided infrastructure for evaluation.
We implemented the Policy CRDT (cf. Section 3.1) and included it
in Antidote’s CRDT library. Antidote offers a Java client, which allows
applications to connect to Antidote and execute update and read operations
based on the provided CRDTs. We implemented ACGreGate as an extension
to this Antidote Java client library. The architecture of ACGreGate (Figure
3) is described in the following paragraphs in detail.
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public interface DecisionProcedure {
boolean decideRead(ByteString currentUser, AntidotePB.ApbBoundObject object,
Object userData, SecurityLayers layers);
boolean decideUpdate(ByteString currentUser, AntidotePB.ApbBoundObject
object, AntidotePB.ApbUpdateOperation op, Object userData, SecurityLayers
layers);
boolean decidePolicyRead(ByteString currentUser, AntidotePB.ApbBoundObject
key, ByteString user, Object userData, SecurityLayers layers);
boolean decidePolicyAssign(ByteString currentUser, AntidotePB.ApbBoundObject
key, ByteString user, Collection<ByteString> newPolicy,
Collection<ByteString> oldPolicy, Object userData, SecurityLayers layers);
LayerDefinition requestedPolicies(ByteString currentUser,
AntidotePB.ApbBoundObject object);
}
Listing 1: The DecisionProcedure interface.
Decision Procedure To implement the online check, ACGreGate inter-
cepts all operations sent by the client library to the Antidote database and
processes them by an access control monitor. This monitor takes an im-
plementation of a decision procedure to make the access control decisions.
The decision procedure is application dependent and corresponds to the se-
curity policy of the application. In principle, the decision procedure takes
the operation, the currently acting user, and the permissions of this user
and decides, whether the operation is allowed to be executed or not. In the
framework implementation, the decision procedure is implemented as a class
implementing the DecisionProcedure interface which can be seen in Listing 1.
The decision procedure is split up for convenience into methods to decide
about read and update operations as well as policy read and policy assign
operations. Depending on the type of operation, different parameters are
provided to the decision procedure, most notably the user performing the
operation and information about the operation itself. Access to the current
permissions of the acting user is provided using the concept of security layers.
The concept behind security layers is best described based on an example.
In our model, each user has a single set of permissions on an object. In
practice, many applications have hierarchical data structures and users are
given permissions on different layers of this hierarchy. A simple example is
a university with lecturers. A lecturer gives a lecture and has full access to
all data regarding this lecture. A teaching assistant supervises the exercise
of the lecture. Tutors may be employed to mentor a group of students in
a particular exercise session. Regarding the data of a student participant,
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users may have permissions from different levels. A lecturer has the per-
mission to access the data of any participant of the exercise if she reads the
corresponding lecture. An assistant of the exercise has permission to ac-
cess the participant’s data if he is the assistant of the participant’s exercise.
Finally, a tutor may access the participant’s data only if she is the partici-
pant’s tutor. In the datastore, this hierarchy can be split into objects with
key references. If we would only allow a single permission set per user and
object, we would have to copy all permissions on the lecture to the exercise
of this lecture and copy all permissions of the exercise to all participants
of this exercise. For registering new participants, we would have to set the
permissions on the lecture and exercise, as well. This approach is error prone
and complex. Instead, we allow to define the hierarchy for an object in form
of a LayerDefinition.
The definition of a layer consists of a name for the layer and the key of
the object the layer refers to. A LayerDefinition can contain multiple layers.
The definition of the layers is transformed into a SecurityLayers object which
allows access to the permissions of the currently acting user on all objects
defined in the the LayerDefinition. The complete set of permissions for a user
on an object can be computed by taking the union of the permissions on
all layers. This approach allows to avoid redundancies in the permission
assignments, but still gives access to the complete set of permissions in a
well-defined way.
Operation Constraints The key-value data stores we consider support
CRDTs which are in essence data types that can safely be used in an un-
synchronized distributed manner. The operations on a CRDT object are
typically on a higher level than in strongly consistent datastores. For ex-
ample, Counter CRDTs allow to increment or decrement the counter and to
read the current value, Set CRDTs allow to add and remove elements and
Map CRDTs allow to update the value of a specific key in the map. Access
control policies on the data level of such a datastore usually restrict these
operations and describe which properties the operations should have.
For maps, we might want to restrict which keys should be updatable and
which key bindings should be removable. For sets, we might want to restrict
which elements should be addable or removable. ACGreGate supports im-
plementing these constraints in the implementation of a decision procedure
by providing a domain specific language to describe these restrictions. An
example of such constraints can be seen in Listing 2.
The constraint specifies that the operation needs to be a map update
(isMapUpdate(...)). The additional constraints are that only the key "participants"
may be updated and no key-value mappings may be removed (noMapRemoves).
The update of the key "participants" is again restricted to be a set update
(isSetUpdate(...)). Additional constraints regarding the update of the partic-
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AntidotePB.ApbUpdateOperation op = ...;
String studentid = ...;
boolean mayParticipate = isMapUpdate(and(
assignsOnly("participants"),
constrainAssigns(keyConstrain("participants",
isSetUpdate(
or(
and(
setAddsOnly(studentid),
noSetRemoves
),
and(
setRemovesOnly(studentid),
noSetAdds
)
)))),
noMapRemoves)).appliesTo(op);
Listing 2: Constraint language examples.
ipant set are that either the student identification number may be added
to the set (setAddsOnly(studentid)) and no elements may be removed from
the set (noSetRemoves), or the other way round. This constraint can be
checked against the operation provided as parameter to the decision proce-
dure (.appliesTo(op)). In the context of the case study presented in Section
4, the semantics of the constraint is that students can add themselves as
participants to an exercise group.
Datastore Layout To guarantee atomicity and causal consistency of data
and policy updates, we persist the permission sets together with the data in
the datastore. Because the permissions should only be modifiable using spe-
cial access control operations, these sets need to be isolated from the other
data in the data store. Antidote supports buckets as name spaces for keys
in the key value store. These buckets are used in ACGreGate to achieve the
isolation between policy and data state. The bucket of the intercepted oper-
ations are prefixed with distinct prefixes depending on wether the operation
is a data or a security operation. The permission sets are saved per object
and user by generating a key based on the object key and the user identifier.
This approach guarantees complete isolation between policy and data state
and avoids accidental or malicious modification of the permission sets.
Interface Modifications To allow easy replacement of the standard client
library with ACGreGate, we kept the interface as close as possible to the
original client interface. Only minor modifications with respect to the trans-
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action interface are needed in order to specify the currently acting user.
When starting a new transaction, the identifier representing the current user
has to be passed as a parameter. All operations executed in this transac-
tion are executed under the name of this user. All other modifications are
done by returning subtypes of the original client library types such that
ACGreGate can act as a substitute to the original client library. The type
AntidoteClient needs to be substituted by SecureAntidoteClient, the type Bucket
needs to replaced with SecuredBucket.
Data Access In practice, access control policies may depend on the data
state of the application. A concrete example of an access control policy that
needs this feature is self-registration for an exercise in a lecture management
system. Students are allowed to register themselves for an exercise while the
exercise registration is open. The flag that signals that the registration is
currently open is usually part of the data state of the application, yet it has
influence on the access control decision. In this case, the decision procedure
implementation will access the object value of the exercise layer and check
the status flag for the exercise registration.
This feature enables additional and powerful policies which enable to
provide also ownership and attribute-based access control. To implement an
ownership model of objects in the database, one could associate a register-
type attribute with each object that holds the current owner of the object.
The decision procedure can access this attribute and decide on the concrete
permissions.
ACGreGate supports policies involving data state by giving the decision
procedure access to the current value of a layer object. However, policies
involving data state are not covered by our theoretical model in [19] and as
such, there is no guarantee that enforcing these policies avoids data leakage
in all cases. Instead, the safety of the policy with respect to data leakage
has to be reasoned about on a per-application and policy level.
4 Case Study
We show the applicability of ACGreGate to practical access control policies
by implementing the access control layer of a student achievement tracking
system (STATS). In the following, we describe the data structure and the
access control policy of STATS.
4.1 Data Model
The purpose of STATS is to manage the grading of exercises associated to
lectures together with the corresponding exams. A student can register an
account which includes personal data such as the name, the student iden-
tification number, and an email address. At the begin of each semester,
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students can register for participation in an exercise. The status of the ex-
ercise registration is indicated by a flag in the exercise object. The students
registered for an exercise are organized into groups for which a time slot on a
specific day is allocated on which a class is given in a specified location. One
or more assistants are responsible for the exercise organization. The exercise
classes are given by tutors which are responsible for several exercise groups.
Students can obtain points for homework submissions which are persisted in
form of a map from sheet id to the achieved points.
Similarly, students can register and participate in exams. An exam can
be an open exam, for example a trial exam, which is indicated by a flag, or
it is only open for students who participated successfully in the exercises. In
the end, the exam results together with the grade assignment are published
which is indicated again by a flag in the corresponding exam object.
4.2 Access Control Policy
The STAT System was developed in the context of maintaining the integrity
of structured data [17]. The access control policy of the STAT System was
formulated in terms of integrity constraints. Therefore, only updates were
originally restricted.
The access control policies for the update operations are defined as fol-
lows. Admins are allowed to perform all updates. Assistants of an exercise
are allowed to modify the attributes of the exercise as well as open and close
the exercise registration. They are also allowed to create and update groups
and sheets of the exercise as well as delete them. Additionally, assistants
are allowed to assign students to groups and take them out again as well
as to assign and remove tutors. Tutors are allowed to assign students of
their group to teams and to modify the results of students in their group.
Examiners can modify the attributes of the exam and can add and remove
participants. They can create, modify and delete tasks and grades and assign
results to participants. Examiners can also open the exam for registration
for students and publish the results of the exam for the participants. Stu-
dents can always register for an exercise, but they can only sign-up for or
sign-out of a group if the exercise registration is open. Students can also
register for and unregister from exams that are open to self-registration. We
now added further the access control rule that assistants and tutors can see
the results of their groups and that examiners can only see the results of
their own exams. Students have only access to their personal results of the
exercises and exams.
These policy rules are based on the application functions. To be imple-
mented as a decision procedure in ACGreGate, they have to be translated to
rules on the data update level. For example, an update of an exercise object
is allowed if the user is an admin, an assistant of this exercise or a student
such that the exercise adds the student id to the set of registered students
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for the exercise. We did this for all rules stated above and implemented a
decision procedure according to these rules. The result is a Java method
with less then 250 lines of Java including error handling and logging. Even
though the rules include dependencies to data values, the system is secure
in the sense that it avoids data leakage:
• The exercise and exam registration flags control, whether students can
register themselves; these flags do not expose additional data.
• Setting the publish flag in the exam exposes the exam results to the
students. Assigning this flag to different values concurrently might
expose the exam results without consensus. However, we argue that
this situation does not arise in practice. Typically, a single examiner
sets the flag on behalf of all examiners once they decided to publish
the results.
5 Evaluation and Results
The STAT System has been in active use in the CS department at the Uni-
versity of Kaiserslautern in Germany since 2011, though the current imple-
mentation is based on a different data persistence layer. We captured the
data state of roughly two years with four exercise iterations and six exams.
A workload generator takes this data and recreates the same data state
in the Antidote backend of STATS. Since the application performs consis-
tency checks, this workload triggers 102 861 datastore read operations and
32 991 datastore update operations. The execution of the decision procedure
triggers additional read operations for retrieving the current policy and ad-
ditional data for some rules. This yields additional 216 923 read operations,
which is an overhead of about 135% over the actual operation. The tests
we report on here were performed on a server with two Intel Xeon E5-2620
CPUs and 64GB of RAM running Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS. We used Docker to
build images of the Antidote database and the STAT System. The Docker
version used was 1.12.6.
We performed two types of tests. In the first setup, we started one con-
tainer with the STAT System with the access control layer implemented
using ACGreGate. This container was connected to a container running An-
tidote using a Docker virtual network. The second setup used a modified
version of the STAT System that forwarded the access control decisions to an
access control server implementing the STATS policy running as a separate
container. The STATS container was connected to the Antidote container
using one virtual network and connected to the access control server using
another separate virtual network. On this network, we used the netem net-
work emulator to simulate different latencies between the application and
the access control server.
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Table 1: Performance results.
net delay request delay throughput duration
ACGreGate - - 1 079.2 ops/s 2:06
nodelay 0ms 0.3ms 1 257.9 ops/s 1:48
small 10ms 13.9ms 75.9 ops/s 29:51
medium 50ms 69.0ms 16.3 ops/s 2:19:11
large 100ms 136.8ms 8.3 ops/s 4:34:21
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Figure 4: Performance comparison for different network delays.
The results of these experiments are given in Table 1. The net delay refers
to the emulated delay of the network between the application and the access
control server. The throughput is calculated for the operations issued by the
application excluding the operations produced by the decision procedure.
The throughput in the ACGreGate and nodelay tests are bounded only by
the performance of a single Antidote node. When adding network delay, this
delay dominates the performance. Even with only 10ms roundtrip delay,
the performance drops from almost 1 300 operations per second to about 76
operations per second. This delay is roughly observed for servers in different
nearby cities in the same country. For more than 50ms of roundtrip delay
on the network, the performance drops by two orders of magnitude to about
16 operations per second, which makes using a central access control server
infeasible for cross-country or even geo-scale replication.
The graph in Figure 4 shows a comparison between the performance on
ACGreGate and the performance of using a central access control server.
ACGreGate has direct access to the policy and gets an immediate response
for reading the permissions from the local state in the Antidote datastore.
This makes the performance independent of the network delay. In contrast,
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the centralized architecture is very sensitive to network delay. For a net-
work delay of 0ms, the centralized architecture performs slightly better then
ACGreGate in our test. The reason for this is that we used a very fast
in-memory data store to implement the access control server whereas AC-
GreGate reads the policies from Antidote. Using a persistent database, for
example Antidote, to implement the access control server would yield a result
equivalent to the performance of ACGreGate for the 0 ms delay case.
When running the workload generator without access control checks en-
abled, the throughput is at roughly 1750 ops/s and the program runs in 1:17
minutes, which shows a slowdown for ACGreGate of about 40%. This slow-
down is not unexpected and depends on the number of requests for additional
information required by the decision procedure. The performance could fur-
ther be improved by co-locating data and security attributes or caching of
access control decisions.
There are access control architectures that influence the performance far
less but also offer less security guarantees. A role-based access control system
can be setup with a central authentication server that also manages the roles
of users. When authenticating to the server, the user opens a session for
which the roles of the user are active that were valid when performing the
authentication. This setup can make access control decisions locally without
contacting the server again and without reading additional data from the
store. But modifications of user permissions do not become effective together
with the data modifications, but only after the next authentication request
of the user. In addition, role-based access control is far more restrictive with
respect to the security policies than the model used by ACGreGate.
6 Related Work
Access Control for Applications using Weakly Consistent Data
Stores The topic of access control for applications using weakly consistent
data stores has received surprisingly little attention. The original version of
Amazon Dynamo [13] did not offer authentication and authorization capabil-
ities. Several other related eventually consistent data stores offer meanwhile
techniques to implement access control, but the granularity is not fine enough
to provide access control on the application level. Riak KV [6], MongoDB
[3], Couchbase [2] and Cassandra [1] all support the management of users,
roles and permissions. But the smallest granularity is on the level of buck-
ets or collections, comparable with tables in relational data bases. Typical
permissions on this level allow to read, write, modify, or delete any value
of the bucket or collection. A more fine-grained permission level relating to
the operations on the application level is not supported. MongoDB Stich
[4] is a framework for applications built on MongoDB that provides support
for access control. The policies supported are mainly based on the current
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data state and correctness of the access control system is not clear for any
definition of access control.
Samarati et. al[18] describe a high-level approach to authorization in
eventually consistent systems. The general idea is to optimistically accept
all operations and compensate the operations which were executed despite
the security policy by performing rollbacks. While this approach guarantees
convergence of the security policy, it is not clear for each operation how to
undo the effect of this operation after it has been executed. One of the
problems is the potential binding between operations and effects in the data
store and changes of the real world. For example, a banking system allows
to withdraw money from an account and the ATM outputs the money. In
this case, it is hard to undo the withdrawal because the person with the
money has already walked away. In addition, the guarantees given by such
an optimistic system remain unclear. Effects of operations can be perceived
by a user of the data store before the rollback, thereby possibly leaking
sensible information.
Wobber et. al[21] present an access control model for weakly consistent,
mutually distrustful replicated systems. Their focus of work is on partial
replication with different access policies per replica. While we consider a
different setting of fully replicated systems, similar problems can be iden-
tified. The causality between a policy and the subsequent operation that
are permitted by the policy is captured in their model by waiting for the
required policy change to arrive. However, the causality between a policy
change that restricts the visibility of the effect of an operation and the sub-
sequent execution of this operation is not captured. As such, the model still
allows leaking sensitive information because of the possible violation of the
protection relation between a policy change and a subsequent data operation.
Access Control for Distributed Applications In the area of access
control for distributed applications, most of the work applies to strongly
consistent systems. Bui et. al[10] developed an algorithm named FACADE
for fast evaluation of stateful attribute-based access control policies. The
policies supported by the algorithm are more expressive than the policies
we consider. In their work, access control decisions can be influenced by
prior access control decisions which requires a linear order of operations and
additional state to coordinate the distributed access control decisions. The
performance impact of the evaluation is too large for the high-performance
applications we consider, the author give an average latency of about 37ms
for their algorithm. In addition to that, the coordination needed to support
stateful access control policies reduces the availability of the application as
described in Section 2.
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6.1 Conclusion
Providing correct, low-latency access control is a challenge for developers
of highly available and scalable systems. A careful analysis of the intricate
interplay of data and policies shows that such an access control system can
be based on causally consistent data stores with support for highly available
transactions and conflict resolution of concurrent updates. To show the
feasibility of such a system, we implemented ACGreGate, a Java framework
for applications based on the Antidote data store. Our case study shows that
ACGreGate allows to implement non-trivial policies encountered in systems
in active use today. As the use case shows, using ACGreGate to implement
access control in an application limits the scalability and performance only
to the scalability and performance of the datastore.
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